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Abstract 
Previous research suggests that infants understand spatiotemporal continuity and are able to reason 
about continuity violations (Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Wynn, 1992). Continuity can be 
violated in two ways – an object suddenly appearing or an object suddenly disappearing. Recent work 
with infants (Wynn & Chiang, 1998) suggests that the two types of violations are not equivalent, with 
infants finding discontinuous disappearances more surprising.  We extend this research to preschool 
children by asking (1) if preschoolers are able to detect violations of continuity and, (2) if the same 
asymmetry found with infants will be found with young children.  In Experiment 1, we used a novel 
paradigm in which children witnessed seemingly “magical” appearances and disappearances of objects in 
box and were asked to report, ‘yes’ or ‘no’, whether a magic trick had occurred on each trial. Like young 
infants, preschoolers successfully detected continuity violations in this task. However, unlike infants, they 
detected discontinuous appearances and disappearances equally well, suggesting that for preschoolers, 
both types of continuity violations are equally salient. Because children could have been tracking the 
number of objects and/or the continuous extent of the hidden set (e.g., total volume of the objects) in 
order to detect the violations, in Experiment 2, we pitted number against continuous extent. Under these 
circumstances, children successfully detected continuity violations and again were much more likely to 
detect “magical” number changes than “magical” volume changes. This result is contrary to previous 
infant research in which infants often track continuous extent better than number (Feigenson, Carey, & 
Spelke, 2002). There was no difference in the rates of detecting disappearances and appearances. 
Experiment 3 was designed to see if preschoolers could be induced to detect “magical” volume changes 
by providing them with familiarization events in which the correct labels (‘yes’ that’s magical or ‘no’ that 
not) were provided. Despite this, preschoolers were no better than chance at detecting “magical” volume 
changes, but again detected “magical” number changes reliably better than chance. In sum, the present 
work suggests that, like infants, preschoolers are sensitive to violations of continuity. But unlike infants, 
appearances and disappearances are equally salient to young children. And finally, children’s ability to 
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detect violations of continuity appears to be accomplished by their tracking number of objects, rather 
than the continuous extent of the hidden set.
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Previous research in infant cognition suggests that human infants possess a small number of 
distinguishable systems of core knowledge that allow them to reason about entities in several domains 
(Spelke, 1994; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). Here we consider the domain of physical knowledge, which 
provides even young babies with expectations about how objects behave in the world (Baillargeon, 
Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Wynn, 1992).  It has been suggested that babies use a set of “object 
principles” to reason about how objects can act and interact (Spelke, 1994; Spelke, Breinlinger, 
Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992).  These object principles include solidity, cohesion, and spatiotemporal 
continuity.  The principle of solidity states that objects are not able to pass through other objects.  Two 
objects cannot occupy the same space simultaneously.  The principle of cohesion states that objects do 
not fall apart when they move, and instead maintain their shape and boundaries.  When object principles 
are violated, for example, when two objects pass though each other or when an object falls apart when it 
is picked up (e.g., a sand pile), infants appear to cease to consider them objects, and seem unable to 
reason about their behavior (Spelke & Van de Walle, 1993).  
      Perhaps the most fundamental principle comprising infants’ core physical knowledge, however, 
is the principle of spatiotemporal continuity (Carey & Xu, 2001; Xu & Carey, 1996).  Spatiotemporal 
continuity suggests that objects follow continuous paths through space and time.  Objects cannot 
magically appear, disappear, or jump from one location to another without passing through the space in 
between.  This idea is similar to the Piagetian idea of object permanence, which Piaget claimed to be a 
fundamental achievement of cognitive development (Piaget, 1954).   
      Violations of continuity are detectable by infants by at least 5 months of age (Baillargeon et al., 
1985).  In Baillargeon’s seminal drawbridge experiment, infants were habituated to a screen rotating 
towards and away from them in a 180
o 
arc.  Following habituation, infants watched an experimenter place 
a block behind and in the path of the screen and were then shown one of two test events.  In the possible 
event, the screen rotated up to the point where it would contact the block and then stopped and reversed 
its motion.  In the impossible event, the screen rotated up and through the space where the block had 
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been seen.  Infants in this experiment looked longer at the impossible test event, suggesting that they 
expected the block to still be there even after it was occluded by the screen.  A control condition in which 
there was no block was also included, and infants in this case looked equally at full and partial rotation 
events, indicating that they were not responding to the differential degree of rotation in the possible and 
impossible events. This research suggests that 5-month-old infants have object permanence, and expect 
that objects continue to exist, even when hidden from sight.   
      Infants have also been shown to detect violations of continuity in the context of simple 
addition/subtraction events (e.g., Simon, Hespos, & Rochat, 1995; Wynn, 1992). In Wynn’s (1992) classic 
study with 5-month-old infants, the infants in one condition were shown an object, and a screen was 
raised to hide the object.  Next, a second object was placed behind the screen, and then the screen was 
lowered to reveal one of two outcomes.  In the possible event, two objects were revealed behind the 
screen – just what an adult would expect.  In the impossible event, the screen was lowered to reveal only 
one object – as if the other object had magically disappeared from behind the screen.  In this situation, 
infants looked longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they were keeping 
track of how many objects were behind the screen, expected them to still be there when the screen was 
lowered, and noticed when one of them seemed to have magically disappeared, violating continuity. 
Violating spatiotemporal continuity 
      Although many studies have shown that infants are good at detecting continuity violations 
(Baillargeon et al., 1985; Spelke et al., 1992, 1994; Wynn, 1992), one study has taken this a step further 
and asked whether infants are equally sensitive to different types of continuity violations.  Continuity can 
be violated by an object impossibly disappearing from a location or by an object impossibly appearing in a 
previously empty location.  Though these violations may seem at first glance to be equivalent, previous 
research suggests they may not be.  In work by Wynn & Chiang (1998), 8-month-old infants successfully 
detected magical disappearances, but not magical appearances.  In the study, infants participated in one 
of two conditions – a disappearance or an appearance condition.  Infants in both conditions saw the same 
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two types of events – an object-put-behind and an object-removed event.   In the object-put-behind event, 
a stage with two spatially-separated screens was set up with one object on the stage, with a second 
(unoccluded) object located off to the side.  The screens were then raised, such that the leftmost screen 
occluded the first object, and an experimenter’s hand pushed the second object behind the rightmost 
screen.  The experimenter’s empty hand then exited.  In the object-removed event, both objects began in 
positions that made them ready to be occluded by the screens, and the screens were then raised.  Next, 
the experimenter’s empty hand entered, and then exited, taking with it the object that had been behind 
the rightmost screen.  
      After both types of events, infants in the disappearance condition watched as the screens 
lowered to reveal just one object.  This outcome was “magical” when it followed the object-put-behind 
event and “expected” when it followed the object-removed event.  Infants in this condition looked 
reliably longer at the magical disappearance than at the expected disappearance, suggesting that they 
were keeping track of the objects behind the screens and noticed when one seemed to have magically 
disappeared.  Infants in the appearance condition saw the same two events (object-put-behind and 
object-removed), but instead of seeing a one-object outcome, two objects were revealed when the 
screens lowered.   This outcome was “magical” when it followed the object-removed event, but 
“expected” when it followed the object-put-behind event.  Unlike the infants in the disappearance 
condition, infants in this condition looked equally at both types of events, suggesting that they did not 
notice when an object magically appeared in the object-removed event.  
      Wynn and Chiang (1998) attributed infants’ superior detection of magical disappearances to a 
mismatch between what the infants were representing mentally and the true state of the world as 
revealed when the screens were lowered. That is, infants in the disappearance condition were 
representing two objects (one behind each screen) and this expectation was violated when only one 
object was revealed. In contrast, infants in the appearance condition were representing one object behind 
the left screen, but had no expectations about what was behind the right screen (perhaps because the 
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representational system responsible for tracking these events, e.g., object indexes or analog magnitudes, 
does not represent empty sets). Therefore, when the screens were lowered to reveal two objects, there 
was no mismatch – infants expected and saw one object behind the left screen, but had no active 
representation for what was behind the right screen (i.e., nothing) and experienced no mismatch.
1
  Based 
on these results, Wynn & Chiang concluded that infants find magical disappearances more salient than 
magical appearances (Wynn & Chiang, 1998).  
Understanding the asymmetry 
 Evidence about whether children and adults more readily detect one or the other type of 
discontinuity is somewhat mixed. Work by Agostinelli, Sherman, Fazio, and Hearst (1986) suggests that in 
some contexts, adults may be better at detecting unexpected appearances than unexpected 
disappearances.  In one experiment, college students studied line drawings for a later pattern completion 
task. Instead, they were given a memory test in which they had to determine whether features had been 
added to or deleted from the drawings.  Results revealed asymmetrical performance, but contrary to the 
infant findings (Wynn & Chiang, 1998), adults were better at detecting appearances than disappearances. 
In a second experiment, however, when participants were informed of the actual purpose of the task and 
given time to study the line drawings they detected disappearances more readily than appearances 
(Agostinelli et al., 1986).  
Similar research with young children suggests they detect appearances more readily than 
disappearances (Miranda, Jackson, Bentley, Gash, & Nallan, 1992).  After studying a clipart picture for 20 
seconds, they were asked to look at another picture and identify the change that had occurred. Pictures 
were simple scenes made with clipart and the two test pictures were identical in all respects except for 
the addition or deletion of a single item. In one experiment, both kindergarten and second grade children 
correctly identified appearances significantly more than disappearances.  The same was true in a further 
experiment, when the items in the study picture had been explicitly named during the study period 
                                                          
1
 This is not unreasonable. It is computationally intractable for a mechanism to represent empty sets since there are 
infinitely many of them. 
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(Miranda et al., 1992). This advantage for appearances with clipart pictures was extended to adults, and 
was also found with three-dimensional objects (Nallan, Bentley, Carr, Lyons, Moore, & Underhill, 1994). 
 One possible explanation for the difference in the direction of the asymmetry for adults and 
children (appearance advantage) compared to infants (disappearance advantage) is the nature of the 
tasks. In Wynn and Chiang’s (1998) work, infants faced a real scene in which a whole object appeared or 
disappeared, making the task an “object tracking” task.  In contrast, the research just reviewed involved 
subjects looking at (or studying) two-dimensional pictures and then trying to identify when an element 
had been added or deleted, a task that may rely more on recognition and recall memory than object 
tracking. Thus, it is not clear whether the asymmetry found in that context is comparable to that found 
with infants.   
Using a task more similar to the infant object tracking task (Wynn & Chiang, 1998) and to the task 
used in the present experiments, research by Subbotskii has also revealed an asymmetry in children’s and 
adults’ detection of discontinuous appearances and disappearances (Subbotskii, 1988; Subbotsky 1996). 
Subbotskii measured children's verbal and physical behavior when they encountered events that violated 
object permanence (i.e. a transformation, an appearance, and a disappearance). Children were 
questioned about the nature of reality and whether or not events that can happen in "fairy tales" can also 
happen in "real life”.  Then they were told a story about a magic box that was capable of making an object 
appear, disappear, or change into another object. In the next phase, children witnessed three different 
violations of object permanence, always in the same order: (1) the transformation of one type of object 
into another type of object, (2) the disappearance of an object, and (3) the appearance of an object. In the 
first trial, the experimenter showed the child a postage stamp that he claimed was created by putting a 
piece of paper into the box on the table.  The children were then allowed to try it themselves by placing 
the paper into the box, closing the lid, and reopening it to find a postage stamp (i.e. a transformation).  
Later, the child was brought back into the room for the second part, a disappearance.  The child was told 
that the box had a further property -- that it could change a stamp into any one of three objects.  
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However, when the child placed the stamp into the box and closed the lid, they found nothing in the box 
when they reopened it, as if the stamp had magically disappeared. In the final part, appearance, the child 
could close and then re-open the box to find a postage stamp where there had been nothing before, as if 
the stamp had magically reappeared. 
Results indicated that nearly all of the children verbally acknowledged the impossibility of 
appearances, disappearances, and transformations in "real life".  And yet, they allowed for such events 
within the realm of "fairy tales". In terms of behavior, the disappearance event generated substantially 
more search than did the transformation or appearance events (Subbotskii, 1988).  This suggests that 
preschoolers were more inclined to engage in search behavior following the discontinuous disappearance 
of an object compared to both the discontinuous appearance of an object and the transformation of one 
object into another. This, however, does not necessarily indicate an advantage for disappearances 
because the likelihood of search should be greater when an object is missing (i.e., a disappearance) than 
when it is present (i.e., appearance or transformation). Evidence from different dependent measures, 
facial expression and voice was more telling. Results indicated that, compared to the appearance and 
transformation events, the disappearance event caused a greater degree of subjective dissonance, as 
measured by facial expressions of surprise (Subbotskii, 1988). Subbotskii argued that this suggests that 
disappearances are more salient than appearances for preschoolers in this context.   Taken together, the 
results of this study are at least suggestive that, like infants, preschoolers may find disappearances more 
salient than appearances.  
 Subbotsky (1996) extended this work by investigating adults' reactions to violations of object 
permanence. Using a modified version of the “magic box” paradigm, he examined adults’ memory 
distortions (i.e. incorrect temporal sequencing), which he believed might reflect the strength of their 
belief in object permanence and any differential sensitivity to appearances and disappearances. Subjects 
first answered questions designed to examine the strength of their belief in object permanence.  Then, 
they were asked to retrieve a toy that had been placed in the room, behind them.  Following this, they 
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were asked to put an object into the box, and close the lid before answering another series of questions. 
In the second phase, more questions were asked, including whether or not anything was unusual about 
the preceding events.  If a subject reported noticing a disappearance or an appearance, a further set of 
questions was asked in order to examine their explanation(s) for the discontinuous appearance or 
disappearance.  Next, the experimenter suggested to the subject that perhaps there was a point during 
the experiment when their attention was drawn away from the box.  Although in every case they had 
retrieved the toy before any objects were ever placed into the box, Subbotsky (1996) predicted that 
adults would remember this retrieval task as interrupting the box manipulations in an attempt to explain 
the discontinuous event with which they were faced, and furthermore, that subjects in the disappearance 
condition would show more temporal distortions in their memory of the order of events compared to 
subjects in the appearance condition. 
The predictions were upheld.  The temporal reconstructions provided by subjects showed that 
they reported the incorrect temporal order of events in the disappearance condition much more often 
than in the appearance condition and, when confronted with a discontinuous event (appearance or 
disappearance), they insisted that there must have been some trick, showing their unwillingness to accept 
the violations of permanence they had witnessed.  Importantly, the fervor with which subjects defended 
their belief in object permanence in the disappearance condition was greater than in the appearance 
condition (Subbotsky, 1996). 
   These results clearly suggest an asymmetry between appearances and disappearances.  
Subbotsky (1996) explained the direction of the asymmetry by proposing that a discontinuous appearance 
presents less of a challenge to one's belief in object permanence than a discontinuous disappearance.  
That is, a subject who has witnessed an appearance can easily explain it away by attributing it to a lack of 
attention on their part.  These results replicate the direction of the asymmetry found by Subbotskii (1988) 
with preschoolers and by Wynn & Chiang (1998) with 8-month-old infants, suggesting that there may be 
continuity across the lifespan in the relative saliency of discontinuous appearances and disappearances.       
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       The present study has two goals. First, we ask whether or not preschoolers can detect violations 
of continuity in a task that is analogous to that used by Wynn and Chiang (1998).  Second, assuming they 
do detect such continuity violations, will they show the same asymmetry – that is, will they be better at 
detecting magical disappearances than appearances?  
Experiment 1 
Although the “magic box” paradigm used by Subbotskii (1988, 1996) was similar in many ways to 
the infant object tracking task in Wynn and Chiang (1998), there were several methodological differences.  
For instance, Subbotskii measured either children's verbal behavior and facial expressions (1988) or 
adults’ memory distortions (1996) in response to encountering events that violated continuity, whereas 
Wynn and Chiang (1998) used looking time measurements.  Subbotskii (1988) also permitted children to 
manipulate the box, whereas participants in Wynn and Chiang’s (1998) experiment did not interact with 
the experimental stimuli.  The present study was designed to be analogous to the infant task, while still 
being engaging to preschoolers to allow for comparison.  
Participants 
 Participants were 24 preschool children (12 females) ranging in age from 2y 11m to 5y 6m.   Five 
additional children were tested, but their data were excluded due to failure to cooperate (1 child), failure 
to complete a full set of test trials due to inattention (3 children), or response bias (1 child).  A response 
bias was defined as giving the same answer on all 20 test trials.  All participants were recruited from the 
greater Columbia, Missouri area.  Parents provided written consent prior to their children’s participation 
in the research.   
Apparatus/Stimuli 
 The stimuli were small toy animals (approximately 2” x 1” x 2”) that were each glued to a foam-
core base (approximately 2” x 2”) containing a magnet.  In order to allow for expected outcomes and to 
create the illusion of magical ones, a “magic box” was built by modifying a wooden box (11”x11”x11.5”), 
so that it contained a false floor that could be surreptitiously rotated by means of a hidden handle.  The 
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rotating floor was covered on both sides with thin sheet metal and then covered with black felt to match 
the inside of the box, which was painted black.  The sheet metal on the false floor allowed the stimuli to 
stick magnetically to the floor even when upside down. The handle and rotating floor were constructed in 
such a way that the turning of the floor was virtually silent. 
Procedure 
      Participants were tested individually in a single 15-minute session in their preschool facility.  
Sessions were videotaped for reviewing and coding purposes.  Each child was asked if they would like to 
play a game with the experimenter.  The experimenter then explained the game to the child and they 
were introduced to the magic box that was said to belong to Ernie (a hand puppet), who sometimes uses 
his magic box to perform magic tricks.   
Familiarization Phase 
 To check for understanding and to provide the opportunity for corrective feedback, each 
participant first received four familiarization trials.  The first two involved a potential color/kind change.  
On the first familiarization trial, a small, white, stuffed baseball remained the same (expected), and on the 
second familiarization trial, the baseball “magically” became a small, orange, stuffed basketball (magical).  
The next two familiarization trials involved a potential number change involving the number zero since 
children have been shown to have trouble understanding it (Wellman & Miller, 1986) and might find it 
magical in its own right.  In the third familiarization trial, the empty box remained empty (expected), and 
on the fourth and final familiarization trial, a small wooden block appeared in the previously empty box 
(magical).  All children received the familiarization trials in the same order.   
In each trial, the child was first shown the initial contents of the box, and then the lid was closed.  
On trials with magical outcomes, the box’s handle was discreetly rotated while the lid was closed in order 
to create the illusion of magic. On trials with expected outcomes, the handle was rotated halfway and 
then back to its original position in order to keep the experimenter’s movements and any noise constant 
across trial types. Since the handle was located on the back of the box, children could not readily see it, 
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and although children frequently inquired how the magic had happened, they never suspected the 
handle. After this, the box was reopened, the child was shown the outcome, and was then asked, “Did 
Ernie do a magic trick?”  The dependent measure was whether the child answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in 
response to this question.  During familiarization, children were provided with feedback on their answers.  
If they answered correctly, they received affirmation (e.g., “You’re right!  That was magical!  Ernie 
changed something!).  If they answered incorrectly, they were corrected (i.e., “Actually, Ernie didn’t do a 
magic trick.  See, it’s still the same thing!” or “Actually, Ernie did do a magic trick.  Look, he made the ball 
change into a different kind of ball!”)  
Test Phase 
 Following familiarization, each child received 20 test trials – half with magical and half with 
expected outcomes. The procedure was identical to familiarization except that children were never 
corrected on test trials and were always praised (e.g., “Great job! Let’s do another one!”), regardless of 
whether they answered the question correctly or not. The first eight test trials were non-operation trials 
in which a potential number change occurred (e.g., 1=2, 1=1). Though simpler from the trials presented to 
infants in Wynn and Chiang’s (1998) study, non-operation events were included here to ensure that 
children could perform the basic task of remembering the contents of the box, noticing when something 
unexpected happened, and using the response labels (‘yes’ or ‘no’) appropriately. The remaining 12 trials 
were operation trials (and analogous to the events in Wynn & Chiang, 1998) in which the experimenter 
added or subtracted an object from the box after showing the child the initial contents and before closing 
the lid (e.g., 1+1=2, 2-1=2). For example, in a 2-1=2 event, the experimenter would show the child two 
objects inside the box and then remove one object while the child watched but was not able to see the 
inside of the box.  This was done in order to ensure that the child would have to mentally update 
representation instead of being allowed to form a new representation by looking inside the box. Finally, 
the box was opened to reveal 2 objects – a magical appearance. 
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 Each child received the test trials in one of two orders. The two orders were determined pseudo-
randomly with the constraint that the same two events did not occur in succession. See Appendix A for a 
list of the all of the events and the two possible trial orders. 
Results  
 For the initial analysis, children were divided into two age groups, older and younger, by 
median split. This was done to examine whether there were any age effects, similar to those found in 
previous research in which toddlers have been shown to fail in search tasks that are analogous to looking 
time tasks in which infants successfully detect violations of solidity (Butler, Berthier, & Clifton, 2002; 
Hood, Carey, & Prasada, 2002; Hood, Cole-Davies, & Dias, 2003). The mean age for the older group was 5 
years, 2 months (Range: 4 years, 7 months – 5 years, 6 months) and the mean age for the younger group 
was 3 years, 7 months (Range: 2 years, 11 months – 4 years, 5 months).  A preliminary 4 x 2 x 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA with Trial Type (expected non-operation, magical non-operation, expected 
operation, and magical operation) as a within-subject factor, and Sex (male or female), Test Order (Order 
1 or Order 2), and Age Group (Younger or Older) as between-subject factors, revealed four significant 
effects. First, there was a main effect of Trial Type (F[3,48] = 7.544, p < .001). As a group, children 
performed better on the non-operation trials (expected: M = 87% correct, SD = 27.0; magical: M = 90%, 
SD = 12.8) than the operation trials (expected: M = 65%, correct, SD = 17.1; magical: M = 70% correct, SD 
= 26.0). None of the other factors interacted with Trial Type. Second, we found a significant main effect of 
Age Group, with older children performing better than younger children (older: M = 83% correct, SD = 
11.4; younger: M = 71% correct, SD = 10.9, F[1,16] = 7.096, p < .02).  However, both age groups performed 
reliably above chance (older: t(11) = 10.83, p < .0001; younger: t(11) = 4.71, p = .001)
2
. Third, there was a 
main effect of Sex, such that males performed significantly better than females (males: M = 84% correct, 
SD = 10.9; females: M = 70% correct, SD = 11.4, F[1,16] = 8.421, p = .01). Although boys outperformed 
girls, follow up analyses indicated that both males’ (M = 85%, SD = 13.5, t(11) = 8.876, p < .0001) and 
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 This and all subsequent T-tests report two-tailed p-values. 
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females’ (M = 72% correct, SD = 13.4, t(11) = 5.574, p < .0001) performance was reliably above chance. 
Finally, there was a significant three-way interaction between Sex, Order, and Age Group (F[1,16] = 6.857, 
p = .019). For males, younger children performed better than older children in Order 1 (younger: M = 92% 
correct, SD = 10.6; older: M = 79% correct, SD = 10.6), but the opposite was true in Order 2 (younger: M = 
68%, SD = 10.6; older: M = 94%, SD = 10.6). For females, older children performed better than younger 
children in both orders (Order 1: older: M = 82%, SD = 10.6; younger: M = 60%, SD = 10.6; Order 2: older: 
M = 76%, SD = 10.6; younger: M = 63%, SD = 10.6). Given that there were no more than five (and as few as 
two) children in any one of these cells, this effect is difficult to interpret.   
 To follow up on the main effect of Trial Type, we performed three paired t-tests – operation vs. 
non-operation events, expected vs. magical non-operation events, and expected vs. magical operation 
events. These were collapsed over Age Group since the two factors did not interact (F[3,48] = .173, p > 
n.s.). Only the comparison of operation vs. non-operation events was significant (operation: M = 88% 
correct, SD = 16.7; non-operation: M = 68% correct, SD = 18.3, t(23) = 5.150, p < .0001). The comparisons 
of expected vs. magical non-operation events (expected: M = 87% correct, SD = 24.4; magical: M = 90% 
correct, SD = 14.6, t(23) = -.681, p = n.s.) and expected vs. magical operation events (expected: M = 65% 
correct, SD = 27.6; magical: M = 70% correct, SD = 23.0, t(23) = -.808, p = n.s.) did not reach significance. 
(See Figure 1.) This pattern of results suggests that within each type of trial (non-operation or operation), 
performance did not vary as a function of whether the outcome was magical or expected. Rather, the 
factor driving the significant effect of Trial Type was superior performance by children on non-operation 
compared to the more complex operation trials.  
 To answer the question of whether preschoolers in our task detected violations of continuity, we 
compared children’s performance against chance.  We conducted two one-sample t-tests on children’s 
mean proportion correct (collapsed across age groups) on operation and non-operation events.  Children 
performed reliably above chance on both (non-operation: M = 88% correct, SD = 16.68, t(23) = 11.17, 
p<.0001; operation: M = 68% correct, SD = 18.13, t(23) = 4.83, p<.0001).   
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Figure 1. Mean percent correct responses on magical and expected non-operation and operation events.  
 
  To examine whether preschoolers exhibited the same asymmetry shown in infants, we 
compared children’s ability to detect magical disappearances and appearances. These analyses were 
conducted on just the operation trials, because these are the events that are analogous to the events 
used with infants in Wynn & Chiang (1998). As a group, there was no difference in children’s ability to 
detect magical disappearances and magical appearances, (MD: M = 72% correct, SD = 34.99, MA: M = 67% 
correct, SD = 31.16, t(23) = .59, p = n.s.).  In addition, children detected both events reliably better than 
chance (MD: t(23) = 3.12, p =.005; MA: t(23) = 2.6, p =.02). Taken together, these results suggest that, 
unlike for infants, magical appearances and disappearances are equally salient to preschoolers in our task. 
(See Figure 2.) 
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Figure 2. Children’s mean percent correct on Magical Disappearance and Magical Appearance operation 
events.  
 
Discussion  
 Overall, children performed better on non-operation events than on operation events.  This is 
not surprising given that in order to detect the continuity violations in the operation events, children must 
represent the initial contents of the box, and then update this representation after an object has been 
added or removed. Non-operation events require only noticing whether or not something has changed 
and may require only perceptual memory. The fact they performed reliably above chance on both types 
of events, however, suggests that they were successfully detecting the continuity violations and that they 
were able to correctly categorize which outcomes were magical and which were not.  
 Unexpectedly, we did not find evidence that magical disappearances were more easily detected 
than magical appearances by preschoolers. Although the small difference in proportion correct favored 
disappearances (72%) over appearances (67%), this difference was not reliable. Thus, in contrast to the 
infant findings (Wynn & Chiang, 1998) and previous work by Subbotskii (1988), preschoolers did not 
exhibit any asymmetry in their detection of discontinuous appearances and disappearances in our task. 
One possible reason why we failed to find the type of asymmetry reported by Wynn and Chiang (1998) 
and Subbotskii (1988, 1996) is that our study required verbal responses, an explicit measure, whereas 
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those of Wynn and Chiang (1998) and Subbotskii (1988, 1996) made use of implicit measures such as 
looking time, facial expression, and memory distortion.   
 Unexpectedly, males performed better than females overall, though both males’ and females’ 
performance was reliably above chance.  This finding, while potentially important, is likely due in large 
part to a small sample, and it would need to be replicated before it could be considered meaningful.   
 Given that children successfully demonstrated knowledge of continuity in our task, one question 
that arises is how they detected the continuity violations. In infant looking time tasks such as that in Wynn 
(1992) and Wynn & Chiang (1998), it has been suggested that infants are responding on the basis of 
continuous extent. That is, they may be responding not to a mismatch in the number of objects, but 
instead to a mismatch in the amount of object stuff expected (e.g., on the basis of some continuous 
variable like contour length or surface area Clearfield & Mix, 1999, 2001). For example, Clearfield and Mix 
(1999) habituated 6- to 8-month-old infants to computer displays containing a fixed number (2 or 3) of 
squares of fixed sizes.  In test trials, infants were shown two alternating displays.  One display featured 
squares with the same total contour length but a different total number of squares than the infants 
viewed during habituation, and the other display featured the same total number of squares as the 
infants saw during habituation, but with a different total contour length. Results showed that infants 
dishabituated to displays of novel contour length and familiar number, but not to displays of novel 
number and familiar contour length, suggesting that they were tracking a continuous quantity (i.e., 
contour length) rather than number. Feigenson, Carey, and Spelke, (2002) found similar results with 6- 
and 7-month-old infants and live displays featuring animal-like Lego objects. The objects were identical in 
all ways with the possible exception of size.  Infants were habituated to either one large object or two 
small objects, and during test trials, they were shown a display featuring a novel number of objects with a 
familiar surface area, or a display featuring novel surface area with a familiar number of objects.  Infants 
in this study also responded to changes in continuous extent and not number (Feigenson et al., 2002).  To 
examine whether preschoolers in our study were using the number of objects or amount of stuff to detect 
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the continuity violations, we conducted a second experiment in which we controlled for continuous 
extent.  
Experiment 2 
Previous research suggests that infants’ tendency to respond to either number or continuous 
extent depends on the nature of the stimuli. When pitted against each other, 6- and 7-month-old infants 
detect a change in continuous extent, but not number, when the objects in the array are identical in 
features (Clearfield & Mix, 2001; Feigenson et al., 2002). However, when the objects have distinct 
features (i.e., distinct colors and patterns), infants respond to a change in number, but not continuous 
extent (Feigenson, 2005). In our first experiment, older children detected continuity violations when the 
objects had identical features. In the present experiment, we pitted volume of the object arrays against 
number to see which dimension is more salient. If children, like infants, are limited to responding on the 
basis of extent for homogenous sets, then they should fail to reliably discriminate the magical and 
expected events in this experiment. If, on the other hand, they are able to respond on the basis of 
number, then they are expected to succeed. 
Participants 
 Participants were 12 (3 female) preschool children ranging in age from 4y 7m to 5y 8m.  One 
additional child was tested, but that child’s data was excluded due to failure to cooperate and to 
complete a full set of test trials.  Since pitting number against volume potentially made the task more 
difficult, and since older children outperformed younger children in Experiment 1, we included only 
“older” children in this experiment to ensure that the results could be clearly interpreted in terms of the 
volume manipulation. All participants were recruited from the greater Columbia, Missouri area. Parents 
provided written consent prior to their children’s participation in the research. 
Apparatus/Stimuli 
 We used the same magic box as in Experiment 1, but created a new set of stimuli in order to 
manipulate number and volume in the event outcomes. The stimuli were small green cubes with volumes 
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measuring two, four, or eight cubic inches.  Each cube was glued to a foam-core base containing a 
magnet.    
Procedure 
      Participants were tested individually in a single 15-minute session. All but five participants (who 
were tested in the lab) were tested at their daycare center. Sessions were videotaped for reviewing and 
coding purposes.  The same procedure from Experiment 1 was used with a few modifications as described 
below.   
Familiarization Phase 
Each participant first received two (rather than four) familiarization trials involving a potential 
color/kind change. These trials were identical to the first two familiarization trials children received in 
Experiment 1. We did not include familiarizations involving zero. Because we controlled for volume, it was 
not possible to include events (here or in the test phase) that had zero either as an initial number or an 
outcome since outcomes of zero have no volume. As in Experiment 1, children were given corrective 
feedback during the familiarization phase. 
Test Phase 
Following familiarization, each child received 16 test trials – half with magical and half with 
expected outcomes in terms of numerosity and volume. The two dimensions were pitted against each 
other such that outcomes that were magical in terms of number were always expected in terms of volume 
and vice versa. The first eight trials were non-operation events in which a potential number change 
occurred (e.g., 1=2 or 1=1).  The next 8 trials were operation events in which the experimenter added or 
subtracted an object from the box after showing the child the initial contents and before closing the lid, 
just as in Experiment 1.  The initial contents of the box were always composed of either one or two cubes 
with total volume measuring either four or eight cubic inches.  One-object outcomes always consisted of a 
single cube with a volume of eight cubic inches, and two-object outcomes always consisted of two cubes, 
each with a volume of two cubic inches (4 cubic inches total). The presentation of the events proceeded 
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exactly as in Experiment 1. See Appendix B for a list of the all of the events and the two possible trial 
orders. 
Results 
 We used proportion ‘yes’ responses as the dependent measure (rather than proportion correct) 
for all remaining analyses (Experiments 2 and 3). Since number and volume were pitted against each 
other, it was not clear whether children would find unexpected volume changes to be “magical”. Using 
proportion correct (as in Experiment 1) would involve implicitly assuming that unexpected volume 
changes were indeed “magical” (or not) to children. Given that we did not know whether children would 
categorize them as magical or not, using proportion ‘yes’ responses provides a clearer picture of 
children’s performance. 
A preliminary 4 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with Trial Type (non-operation number 
change, non-operation volume change, operation number change, and operation volume change) as a 
within-subject factor, and Sex (male or female) and Test Order (Order 1 or Order 2) as between-subject 
factors revealed two significant effects
3
 -- a main effect of Trial Type (F[3,24) = 36.11, p < .0001), and a 
main effect of Test Order (F[1,8] = 6.88, p = .03). For both non-operation and operation events, children 
responded ‘yes’ more often when number was magical (non-operation: M = 100%, SD = 0; operation: M = 
88%, SD = 16.86), than when volume was magical (non-operation: M = 8%, SD = 22.19; operation: M = 
46%, SD = 31.68). Paired t-tests comparing children’s tendency to respond ‘yes’ on magical number and 
volume events revealed reliable differences for both non-operation events (t(11) = 14.31, p < .0001) and 
operation events (t(11) = 4.21, p = .001).  
     To further examine children’s tendency to categorize unexpected number and volume change 
events as “magical”, we compared proportion ‘yes’ responses for three of the four trial types against 
chance (children were at ceiling on non-operation number change trials, 100% ‘yes’ responses, so no 
analysis was conducted on these events). Children’s performance was significantly above chance on 
                                                          
3
 Note that the main effect of sex was non-significant (F[1,8] = .43, p = .53). However, given that the gender 
composition of the sample was uneven (3 females and 9 males), the validity of this insignificant result should be 
interpreted with caution.  
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operation number change trials (88% ‘yes’ responses, t(11) = 7.71, p < .0001), suggesting that they 
successfully detected continuity violations when number and volume were pitted against each other. In 
contrast, performance was significantly below chance on non-operation volume change trials (8% ‘yes’ 
responses, t(11) = -6.50, p < .0001) and was no different from chance on operation volume change trials 
(46% ‘yes’ responses, t(11) = -.46, p = n.s.), suggesting that children did not find unexpected volume 
changes “magical” in either context. (See Figure 3.) Note, however, that the tendency to respond ‘yes’ to 
unexpected volume changes was significantly greater for operation events (46%) than non-operation 
events (8%), (t(11) = 3.76, p < .005), suggesting that children may track multiple cues in operation events. 
 
Figure 3. Children’s mean percent “yes” across non-operation and operation events as a function of 
magical trial type.  
 
 We also examined preschoolers’ performance on magical disappearances and appearances (see 
Figure 4) and found that children detected both event types reliably at better than chance levels (MD: M = 
92% ‘yes’, SD = 19.5, t(11) = 7.4, p < .0001; MA: M = 83% ‘yes’, SD = 24.6, t(11) = 4.7, p = .001), and that 
there was no difference in the rates of detection of the two events (t(11) = 1.0, p = .34).   
 
20 
 
 
Figure 4. Children’s mean percent “yes” on Magical Disappearance and Magical Appearance events. 
 
 In addition to the main effect of Trial Type, we also found a main effect of Test Order (F[1,8] = 
6.88, p = .03), reflecting a reliable difference in the average overall rates of responding ‘yes’ between the 
children in each of the two test orders. Children in Order 1 responded ‘yes’ 68% of the time (SD = 11.5), 
while children in Order 2 responded ‘yes’ 53% of the time (SD = 5.23). This difference, though significant, 
may not be particularly informative, as there is no immediately obvious explanation for it. In our opinion, 
the only striking difference between the two orders is whether the first trial was unexpected in number or 
volume. Children in Order 1 received the former, while children in Order 2 received the latter. It is 
possible, though we think unlikely, that the differential salience of the unexpected change (either highly 
salient in the case of number changes, or less salient in the case of volume changes), affected children’s 
initial response (most often ‘yes’ in Order 1, most often ‘no’ in Order 2) and set the stage for later 
responding. It cannot be the case that the initial response set up a response bias, since children in Order 
2, most all of whom responded with ‘no’ on the first test trial, said ‘yes’ and ‘no’ almost an equal number 
of times over the course of the experiment. Rather, it might be possible that children who responded ‘yes’ 
on the first test trial became more inclined to do so, eventually saying ‘yes’ 68% of the time, a value that 
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is significantly above chance, (t(5) = 3.78, p < .02. Note however, that there were only six children in each 
order. Consequently, we do not wish to place too much emphasis on this result unless proven replicable.  
Discussion 
Preschool children overwhelmingly responded to violations of continuity when number was 
pitted against volume, suggesting that number is more salient than volume in this task. This is contrary to 
previous studies with infants suggesting that continuous extent dominates children’s responses in these 
types of events (e.g., Clearfield & Mix, 1999, 2001; Feigenson, et al., 2002, Mix, Huttenlocher, & Levine, 
2002). It is possible that infants do find continuous extent more salient than number, and that there is a 
developmental shift that occurs by around age 5 such that number becomes more salient than continuous 
extent. However, recent research by Cordes and Brannon (2009) failed to replicate Clearfield and Mix’s 
(1999) result that infants respond to continuous extent and not number, showing instead that infants 
respond to both continuous extent and number with small sets of objects. Thus, it is possible that our 
finding reflects a much less dramatic shift, where number and continuous extent are initially equally 
salient, and then over time, number becomes relatively more salient, even for small sets of identical 
objects, as was used in our experiment.  
Preschoolers again detected magical number outcomes better on non-operation events than on 
operation events, though they were more likely to respond to magical volume outcomes on operation 
events than on non-operation events, suggesting that they may have been attending to and encoding 
volume and using it to reason about events in which the remembered set underwent a hidden 
transformation. 
As in Experiment 1, preschoolers detected both magical disappearances and magical 
appearances at reliably better than chance levels, and there was no difference in the rate of detection of 
these event types. This replicates the finding in our first experiment and suggests that preschoolers may 
not find magical disappearances more salient than appearances, at least not as measured by their explicit 
verbal categorization of these event types.  
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Although these results are suggestive, two limitations led us to conduct a third experiment. First, 
we felt that because the sample size was relatively small, the findings should be replicated with a larger 
sample. Second, the outcome on every trial was “magical” in terms of either number or volume.  The 
absence of “catch” trials in which no change occurred (i.e., the number and volume were both correct) 
would have helped determine what children’s baseline rate of responding ‘yes’ was in this experimental 
context and provide a metric for determining just how “magical” unexpected number and volume really 
were.  
Experiment 3 
 Since children in Experiment 2 very clearly detected magical number changes, but not magical 
volume changes, Experiment 3 was designed to try to induce children to detect and categorize 
unexpected volume changes as “magical”. Previous work by Mix and her colleagues suggests that both 
infants and young children attend preferentially to continuous amount (e.g., surface area, contour 
length), and that attention to number develops later than attention to continuous quantities (Mix et al., 
2002). We therefore were interested to see whether children could be made to respond on the basis of 
volume in our task. To accomplish this, we manipulated the nature of the familiarization children received 
so that some of the children received feedback explicitly showing them that unexpected volume changes 
should be labeled as “magical”.  In addition, we included “catch” trials in which outcomes were expected 
in terms of both number and volume to obtain a baseline measure of children’s tendency to categorize an 
event as “magical” when nothing has changed.  
Participants 
 Participants were 24 (12 females) preschool children ranging in age from 4y 8m to 5y 9m. We 
again tested only “older” children because the events are potentially difficult and we wanted the results 
to be directly comparable to Experiment 2. One additional child was tested, but the data were excluded 
due to failure to cooperate and to complete a full set of test trials.  All participants were recruited from 
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the greater Columbia, Missouri area. Parents of all participants provided written consent for their child’s 
participation prior to testing. 
Apparatus/Stimuli 
 We used the same magic box as in Experiments 1 and 2, and we used the same green cubes as in 
Experiment 2 for the test trials. The stimuli for the familiarization trials included the toy objects from 
Experiment 1 as well as two newly-constructed blue Lego cubes measuring two and four cubic inches, 
respectively.  
Procedure 
      Participants were tested individually in a single 15-minute session. All but six participants (who 
were tested in the lab) were tested at their daycare center. Sessions were videotaped for reviewing and 
coding purposes.  The same procedure from Experiment 1 was used except as noted below.   
Familiarization Phase 
Each participant first received four trials in which they were familiarized with either to non-
quantity related changes (Kind Fam) or quantity-related changes (Amount Fam). An equal number of 
children (n=12) participated in each familiarization condition. In the Kind Fam condition, preschoolers 
were familiarized with potential color/kind changes, just as in Experiment 2.  In the Amount Fam 
condition, preschoolers were familiarized with both potential number changes (i.e., two ducks turning 
into one duck or remaining as two) and potential volume changes (i.e., a blue Lego block with a volume of 
2 cubic inches turning into a blue Lego block with a volume of 4 cubic inches or remaining 2 cubic inches 
in volume). There were two different familiarization orders in each of the two familiarization conditions, 
which differed in the order in which children saw the various stimuli used in the familiarization trials. For 
example, in the Kind Fam, children would either see trials involving a duck and a frog before trials 
involving a baseball and a basketball or vice versa.  In the Amount Fam, children would either see trials 
involving a potential number change before trials involving a potential volume change or vice versa. In all 
cases, children received familiarization trials in which the correct answer sequence was ‘no’, ‘yes’, ‘yes’, 
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‘no’ (i.e., expected, magical, magical, expected). As in Experiments 1 and 2, children were given corrective 
feedback during the familiarization phase. 
Test Phase 
Following familiarization, each child received 12 test trials – four “catch” trials in which the 
outcome was expected in terms of both number and volume, four trials whose outcomes were magical in 
terms of number, but expected in terms of volume, and four trials whose outcomes were magical in terms 
of volume, but expected in terms of number. The first six trials were non-operation trials in which a 
potential number or volume change occurred (e.g., 1=2 or 1=1).  The final six trials were operation trials in 
which the experimenter added or subtracted an object from the box after showing the child the initial 
contents and before closing the lid, just as in Experiments 1 and 2.  The initial contents of the box were 
always composed of either one or two cubes with total volume measuring either four or eight cubic 
inches, respectively.  With the exception of the “catch” trials in which the initial contents of the box 
remained unchanged, one-object outcomes always consisted of a single cube with a volume of eight cubic 
inches, and two-object outcomes always consisted of two cubes, each with a volume of two cubic inches 
(4 cubic inches total). The presentation of the events proceeded exactly as in Experiments 1 and 2. See 
Appendix C for a list of the all of the events and the two possible trial orders. 
Results  
 A preliminary 6 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with Trial Type (non-operation catch, 
non-operation number change, non-operation volume change, operation catch, operation number 
change, and operation volume change) as a within-subject factor, and Sex (male or female), 
Familiarization Condition (Kind Fam or Amount Fam), Familiarization Order (Order 1 or Order 2), and Test 
Order (Order 1 or Order 2) as between-subject factors revealed only one significant effect, a main effect 
of Trial Type (F[5,40] = 25.18, p < .0001). No other main effects or interactions were significant (all p’s > 
.05). Note that we again found no main effect of Sex (F[1,8] = .30, p = .60), suggesting that the difference 
seen in Experiment 1 was likely spurious.  
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To follow up on the effect of Trial Type, we performed six independent samples t-tests against 
chance (50%) – non-operation catch, operation catch, non-operation number change, operation number 
change, non-operation volume change, and operation volume change.  On the catch trials, preschoolers 
reported that a magic trick had occurred (i.e., answered “yes”) significantly less than chance on both non-
operation (M = 8%, SD = 19, t(23) = -10.72, p < .0001), and operation trials (M = 21%, SD = 33 t(9) = -4.37, 
p < .0001).  On unexpected number change trials, preschoolers said ‘yes’, that a magic trick had occurred, 
significantly more often than chance on both non-operation (M = 96%, SD = 14,  t(23) = 15.91, p < .0001) 
and operation trials (M = 79%, SD = 29, t(23) = 4.90, p < .0001) trials.  Finally, on unexpected volume 
change trials, preschoolers tendency to report ‘yes’ was significantly below chance for non-operation 
events M = (31%, SD = 41, t(23) = -2.23, p = .04), and was no different from chance on operation events 
(40%, SD = 39, t(23) = -1.31, p = .20). (See Figure 5.) 
 
 
Figure 5. Children’s proportion ‘yes’ responses on the six trial types. 
 
Next, we performed two paired t-tests comparing performance on unexpected number and 
volume changes separately for non-operation and operation events.  In both non-operation (t(23) = 7.369, 
p <.001) and operation (t(23) = 5.000, p <.001) events, preschoolers were significantly more likely to say 
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that magic had occurred in a number change event than in a volume change event. This was the case even 
for children who were in the Amount Fam condition, who received explicit feedback directing their 
attention toward the possibility of magical volume changes and who were aware that such events should 
be labeled as “magical”. In fact, the rates of responding ‘yes’ to the various events was very similar across 
the two familiarization conditions (all ts (22) < 1.5, all ps = n.s.). (See Table 1.) This suggests that even 
under supportive conditions, preschoolers did not find magical volume changes salient or compelling 
enough to label them as “magical” any more often than when no explicit support was given, a finding 
supported by the fact that the main effect of Fam condition was far from significant.  (F[1,8] = .14, p = 
.72).   
 
 
 
Non-operation Operation 
 
“Catch” 
Number 
Change 
Volume 
Change 
“Catch” 
Number 
Change 
Volume 
Change 
Kind Fam 
(N=12) 
4%  
(14%) 
100% 
(0%) 
33% 
(44%) 
17% 
(33%) 
88% 
(23%) 
42% 
(42%) 
Amount 
Fam 
(N=12) 
13% 
(23%) 
92% 
(20%) 
29% 
(40%) 
25% 
(34%) 
71% 
(33%) 
38% 
(38%) 
 
Table 1. Mean percent ‘yes’ responses (SDs in parentheses) for catch trials, number change events, and 
volume change events as a function of familiarization condition. 
 
Finally, we conducted a paired t-test to compare preschooler’s responses on magical 
disappearance and magical appearance events, and again found no difference in their ability to detect 
magical disappearances and magical appearances (t(23) = .901, p = n.s.). 
Discussion 
 Children again detected continuity violations, even when number and volume were pitted 
against each other. They performed well on catch trials, labeling these events as “magical” significantly 
less often than chance. This indicates that even in the face of unexpected number and volume changes, 
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they were able to correctly identify when nothing had changed, and when values along both dimensions 
were expected. Preschoolers again overwhelmingly responded to number when number was pitted 
against volume, replicating the finding from Experiment 2, but with a larger sample. They responded to 
magical number changes at levels significantly above chance on both non-operation and operation events, 
but were below or at chance on both types of volume change events. This strongly suggests that in this 
task, number is the more salient dimension when pitted against volume. We again replicated the finding 
from Experiment 1 in which children detected both magical disappearances and magical appearances at 
better than chance levels, and as before, there was no difference in their rates of detection of the two 
event types.  
 
General Discussion 
 Three different samples of children in three different experiments successfully detected 
continuity violations in a task analogous to that used by Wynn and Chiang (1998).  However, we found no 
evidence that preschoolers are any more sensitive to impossible disappearances than to impossible 
appearances.  This was found to be true both when number was confounded with continuous extent 
(Experiment 1) and when number and continuous extent were pitted against each other (Experiments 2 
and 3).  One possible reason why we failed to find the type of asymmetry reported by Wynn and Chiang 
(1998) and Subbotskii (1988, 1996) is that our study required verbal responses, an explicit measure, 
whereas those of Wynn and Chiang (1998) and Subbotskii (1988, 1996) made use of implicit measures 
such as looking time, facial expression, and memory distortion. Given that the direction of difference was 
consistent in all three experiments (greater detection of magical disappearances compared to 
appearances), our explicit measure may just not be sensitive enough to detect a difference.  
Alternatively, it is possible that there is a genuine developmental shift between infancy and early 
childhood in which children become more sensitive to magical appearances, becoming equally sensitive to 
them by around 5 years of age. On Wynn and Chiang’s (1998) account, the asymmetry apparent in 8-
28 
 
month-old infants can be attributed to processes that underlie the representation of sets (e.g., analog 
magnitudes or object tracking processes). Specifically, they suggested that magical disappearances are 
detected when there is a mismatch between what is represented and the true state of the world. The 
failure of infants to detect magical appearances, they suggest, may be due to these processes failing to 
represent empty sets (Wynn & Chiang, 1998). In other words, the analog magnitude system and/or the 
object tracking processes do not actively represent the empty locations and when an object is revealed in 
a previously empty location, no mismatch is detected. Our results suggest a possible developmental shift 
in which these processes become able (in some way) to detect these mismatches.  
Our results are not readily reconcilable with Subotskii’s (1988, 1996) findings in which 
preschoolers and adults seemed to detect magical disappearances more readily than magical 
appearances. However, the dependent measures used in his work were quite different from our own. We 
might have seen more of an asymmetry if we were able to accurately measure children’s facial 
expressions in our task. Nonetheless, our results are consistent with this previous work in that in both 
studies, children successfully detected both types of events. Therefore, the differences may not be 
qualitative, but more a matter of degree. Future experiments should include implicit measures such as 
facial expressions in order to further examine whether children’s reactions to magical appearances and 
disappearances are similar or different in the two studies.    
 In Experiments 2 and 3, when number was pitted against volume, preschoolers still reliably 
detected violations of continuity.  In contrast to results obtained with infants (Clearfield & Mix, 1999, 
2001), preschoolers found number changes more salient than volume changes in both non-operation and 
operation events in our task.  Preschoolers do appear to be influenced by volume changes more in 
operation events than in non-operation events, though they overwhelmingly respond to changes in 
number in both types of events.  It could be that preschoolers are representing and keeping track of 
multiple cues (i.e., number and continuous extent) and that socialization at home and/or school has 
taught them to respond primarily to number, especially in an educational setting such as a preschool or 
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laboratory, and in the context of a perceived educational game.   Research by Cordes and Brannon (2009) 
lends support to the idea that preschoolers may be keeping track of multiple quantity cues. Their recent 
research with infants suggests that infants do in fact continue to represent number even when a 
representation of continuous extent is sufficient for reasoning in a task. This research also provides 
evidence that infants may not respond to a change in continuous extent more than to a change in number 
(as suggested by Clearfield & Mix (1999, 2001)). According to Cordes and Brannon (2009), numerical 
representations are more sensitive/precise than are representations of continuous extent.  Perhaps by 
preschool age, children have learned (implicitly or explicity) that this is the case and tend to rely on their 
representations of number over continuous extent.    
 In Experiment 3, it was found that differential familiarization did not affect performance on 
number change or volume change trials.  There were no differences in performance between children 
familiarized to the possibility of number/volume changes and children who were not. Indeed, children 
were even less likely (though not reliably so) to correctly categorize magical and expected volume changes 
when familiarized to the possibility of such events and after having received feedback (i.e., in the amount 
familiarization condition). It is possible that children did not spontaneously notice the size change during 
familiarization and that the feedback they received had the effect of confusing them more than alerting 
them to the notion that impossible volume changes are magical.  
 Overall, preschool children’s ability to detect continuity violations in a task analogous to that 
used with infants (Wynn & Chiang, 1998) suggests continuity in the development of spatiotemporal 
continuity.  Though we failed to replicate the asymmetry between magical disappearances and magical 
appearances found by Wynn and Chiang (1998) and Subbotskii (1988, 1996), it should be noted that, in all 
three experiments, children did detect magical disappearances slightly better than magical appearances, 
and perhaps with a larger sample size, the results would reach significance.  Additionally, though our 
results with respect to the relative salience of number vs. volume were found to be inconsistent with the 
work of Clearfield and Mix (1999, 2001), they are in line with those obtained by Cordes and Brannon 
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(2009), suggesting that there is continuity in the saliency of discrete and continuous quantity from infancy 
to early childhood.  
The present results can potentially inform early education initiatives in that understanding of 
number may be more easily taught than understanding of continuous quantities such as volume. The brief 
familiarization we provided children did not substantially increase their attention to volume, however, it 
remains possible that more rigorous protocols could have some effect. Future research could explore this 
further, examining the conditions under which children may be led to attend to volume. 
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Appendix A. 
Experiment 1 
 
Sequence One Sequence Two 
1=1 (expected) 1=0 (magical disappearance) 
2=2 (expected) 2=1 (magical disappearance) 
2=1 (magical disappearance) 1=1 (expected) 
1=1 (expected) 1=2 (magical appearance) 
1=2 (magical appearance) 2=2 (expected) 
0=1 (magical appearance) 0=0 (expected) 
1=0 (magical disappearance) 0=1 (magical appearance) 
0=0 (expected) 1=1 (expected) 
2-1 = 1 (expected disappearance) 0+2 = 0 (magical disappearance) 
0+2 = 2 (expected appearance) 0+1 = 1 (expected appearance) 
2-2 = 2 (magical appearance) 1-1 = 0 (expected disappearance) 
0+1 = 0 (magical disappearance) 2-1 = 2 (magical appearance) 
1-1 = 1 (magical appearance) 1+1 = 1 (magical disappearance) 
1+1 = 2 (expected appearance) 2-2 = 0 (expected disappearance) 
0+2 = 0 (magical disappearance) 2-1 = 1 (expected disappearance) 
0+1 = 1 (expected appearance) 0+2 = 2 (expected appearance) 
1-1 = 0 (expected disappearance) 2-2 = 2 (magical appearance) 
2-1 = 2 (magical appearance) 0+1 = 0 (magical disappearance) 
1+1 = 1 (magical disappearance) 1-1 = 1 (magical appearance) 
2-2 = 0 (expected disappearance) 1+1 = 2 (expected appearance) 
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Appendix B. 
Experiment 2 
 
Sequence One Sequence Two 
2=1 (4&4 = 8)  
(magical disappearance) 
1=1  (4=8) 
(expected number) 
1=1  (4=8) 
(expected number) 
1=2 (4 = 2&2) 
(magical appearance) 
2=2 (4&4 = 2&2) 
(expected number) 
2=1 (4&4 = 8)  
(magical disappearance) 
1=2 (4 = 2&2) 
(magical appearance) 
2=2 (4&4 = 2&2) 
(expected number) 
1=2 (4 = 2&2) 
(magical appearance) 
2=2 (4&4 = 2&2) 
(expected number) 
2=2 (4&4 = 2&2) 
(expected number) 
1=2 (4 = 2&2) 
(magical appearance) 
1=1 (4=8)  
(expected number) 
2=1 (4&4 = 8) 
(magical disappearance) 
2=1 (4&4 = 8) 
(magical disappearance) 
1=1 (4=8)  
(expected number) 
1+1 = 1  (4+4 = 8) 
(magical disappearance) 
2-1 = 1 (4&4 – 4 = 8)  
(expected disappearance) 
2-1 = 1 (4&4 – 4 = 8)  
(expected disappearance) 
1+1 = 1 (4 + 4 = 8)  
(magical disappearance) 
1+1 = 2 (4+4 = 2&2) 
(expected appearance) 
2-1 = 2 (4&4 – 4 = 2&2)  
(magical appearance) 
2-1 = 2 (4&4 – 4 = 2&2)  
(magical appearance) 
1+1 = 2 (4 + 4 = 2&2)  
(expected appearance) 
1+1 = 1 (4 + 4 = 8)  
(magical disappearance) 
2-1 = 1 (4&4 – 4 = 8) 
(expected disappearance) 
1+1 = 2 (4 + 4 = 2&2)  
(expected appearance) 
2-1 = 2 (4&4 – 4 = 2&2) 
(magical appearance) 
2-1 = 1 (4&4 – 4 = 8) 
(expected disappearance) 
1+1 = 1 (4 + 4 = 8)  
(magical disappearance) 
2-1 = 2 (4&4 – 4 = 2&2) 
(magical appearance) 
1+1 = 2 (4 + 4 = 2&2)  
(expected appearance) 
 
Note:  Events are first described in terms of their numerical elements, and then characterized in terms of volume in 
parentheses.  
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Appendix C. 
Experiment 3 
 
Sequence One Sequence Two 
2=1 (4&4 = 8)  
(magical disappearance) 
1=2 (4 = 2&2) 
(magical appearance) 
1=1  (4=4) 
(catch) 
2=2  (4&4=4&4) 
(catch) 
2=2 (4&4 = 2&2) 
(expected number) 
1=1  (4=8) 
(expected number) 
1=2 (4 = 2&2) 
(magical appearance) 
2=1 (4&4 = 8)  
(magical disappearance) 
1=1  (4=8) 
(expected number) 
1=1  (4=4) 
(catch) 
2=2  (4&4=4&4) 
(catch) 
2=2 (4&4 = 2&2) 
(expected number) 
1+1 = 2 (4 + 4 = 4&4)  
(catch) 
2-1 = 1 (4&4 – 4 = 4) 
(catch) 
2-1 = 2 (4&4 – 4 = 2&2) 
(magical appearance) 
1+1 = 1  (4+4 = 8) 
(magical disappearance) 
1+1 = 2 (4 + 4 = 2&2)  
(expected appearance) 
1+1 = 2 (4 + 4 = 2&2)  
(expected appearance) 
1+1 = 1  (4+4 = 8) 
(magical disappearance) 
2-1 = 2 (4&4 – 4 = 2&2) 
(magical appearance) 
2-1 = 1 (4&4 – 4 = 4) 
(catch) 
1+1 = 2 (4 + 4 = 4&4)  
(catch) 
2-1 = 1 (4&4 – 4 = 8) 
(expected disappearance) 
2-1 = 1 (4&4 – 4 = 8) 
(expected disappearance) 
 
Note:  Events are first described in terms of their numerical elements, and then characterized in terms of volume in 
parentheses.  
 
 
